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Abstract 
This paper examines the process of implementation of work-place ergonomics within thirteen 
plants of the largest division of an automobile manufacturing firm. The process began as plants 
reacted with varying degrees of conformance to institutional pressures to utilize ergonomics in job 
design. While all thirteen plants to some degree “adopted” an ergonomics program, varied con- 
formity reactions were manifested in different internal processes which in turn led to different 
types and levels of implementation. A grounded theory approach was used to build an overall 
process model that encompasses all plants’ processes. Based on the model, ergonomics adoption 
is viewed as a value-laden process. The internal organizational consequences are then discussed 
in terms of contrasting types of internal goals, strategic structures, and implementation ap- 
proaches. Theoretical as well as practical implications of the model are presented. A new direction 
for future research in the field of technology adoption and implementation is proposed. 
Keywords. Technology implementation, Technology adoption, Organizational culture and change, 
Institutional theory, Ergonomics, Human factors. 
1. Introduction 
The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) has begun to 
issue heavy citations to manufacturing companies that knowingly fail to re- 
duce ergonomics-related health risks. For instance, The New York Times, 
Business, August, 1988, reports that OSHA has fined meat packing companies 
on the order of several million dollars for failing to improve potentially un- 
healthy ergonomic conditions. Due to increasing media coverage, the public 
has also become more aware of ergonomically related disorders such as the 
Carpal Tunnel Syndrome (CTS ). Moreover, as the existing labor pool is ex- 
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petted to decline drastically in this decade (Jackson, 1989), more corporate 
energy is expected to be spent on maintenance of health of existing workers. 
For example, in 1990, Pacific Bell launched an $8 million program to reduce 
stress and strain among workers who use video terminal displays (VTD ) (Bu- 
reau of National Affairs, 1990). Ergonomic issues are, therefore, expected to 
play an important role in corporate strategy making, not only to avoid heavy 
fines and damaging publicity, but to alleviate the impact of the workforce 
transition. 
It has been argued that ergonomics research is essential to understanding 
“human-at-work” systems and “stress-strain” relationships in the work place 
(Rohmert, 1986). Many researchers have studied ergonomics as an approach 
to reducing work-related stress (e.g., Ferguson, 1973; Murphy, 1984; Hawkins, 
1987; Melamed et al., 1989). However, the research scope of its organizational 
implications has been limited to the participatory aspect of its implementation 
(e.g., Chaney, 1969; Joseph et al., 1986; Pope, 1987; Liker et al., 1990; Orta- 
Anes, 1991). 
The degree of cooperation between management and workers on work en- 
vironment and work place designs is noted as an important factor influencing 
the implementation of ergonomics (Kvalseth, 1980; Liker et al., 1984; Majchr- 
zak, 1988). The participative approach to ergonomics implementation has been 
shown to be successful in a number of industries in different countries (Noro 
and Imada, 1991). The literature, however, largely lacks discussion of the or- 
ganizational process through which the purported success has been achieved. 
To the best of our knowledge, no study has been conducted to-date on the 
overall process of how ergonomics is disseminated and implemented in 
organizations. 
The purpose of this paper is twofold. One is to develop a process model of 
ergonomics implementation in manufacturing environments. The other is to 
elucidate elements of the process which influence the effective utilization of 
ergonomics tools and knowledge. By doing so, we hope to make practical as 
well as theoretical contributions. To some degree the insights gained from this 
study should be applicable to technology implementation in general, though 
ergonomics has some characteristics that set it apart from other types of 
technologies. 
There are at least three features of ergonomics that make it interesting for 
the study of implementation of technology. First, it is intended by its creators 
to positively influence both the technical and human systems of work. That is, 
if properly applied, ergonomics methods should improve the technical quality 
and efficiency of production while making jobs safer for the worker. Second, 
application of the technology is characterized by a high degree of uncertainty 
and “equivoque” to use Weick’s (1990) term. While for some ergonomics tools 
there are clear guidelines on what is acceptable and unacceptable, for others it 
is a judgement call. For example, OSHA has no formal quantitative standards 
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to identify unacceptable ergonomic conditions. Moreover, the benefits of er- 
gonomic improvements may not be visible for many years after implementa- 
tion and there is not a clearly measurable cause-and-effect relationship be- 
tween implementation and outcomes. Third, ergonomics as a body of technology 
has been very underutilized in industries. The lack of implementation has been 
the main basis for OSHA citations. OSHA has been determining negligence in 
ergonomics through “willful violation”, identifying cases where companies 
failed to implement improvements to known ergonomics problems. For ex- 
ample, OSHA has uncovered instances in which plants had outside consultants 
identify ergonomics problems but did not take any actions to improve the jobs. 
The paper is based on qualitative field research in thirteen plants within the 
same division of a large automotive manufacturer. We compare and contrast 
the different implementation approaches tried by these plants and their con- 
sequential outcomes. Hendrick (1986) and Geirland (1989) point out that 
past research in ergonomics has focused largely on technical and engineering 
aspects and little on the implementation of ergonomics in organizational con- 
text. Our process model will describe the organizational dynamics of imple- 
mentation activities and their implications for broader theoretical issues. 
2. Literature review 
The term ergonomics derives from the Greek words ergon, work, and nomos, 
law. Ergonomics, then, means laws of work or, by extension, rules or principles 
of physical or mental activities. Ergonomics concentrates on the cognitive and 
physiological effects on individuals of the technologies in their environment 
(McCormick and Sanders, 1982 ) . McCormick and Sanders define the goal of 
ergonomics as “to guide the application of technology in the direction of ben- 
efitting humanity” (p. 4). In this light, ergonomics may be regarded as a tech- 
nology to guide technology, by setting design and job set-up guidelines based 
on the principles of human factors. 
Work-place ergonomics is a special subfield of ergonomics. It typically fo- 
cuses on repetitive manual labor in the work place. In the cases in this field 
research, it mainly focuses on the physiological limitations of workers, beyond 
which, if repeatedly exerted, some serious negative health effects may be in- 
curred. Some examples of negative effects are irreparable physical damages 
such as loss of hearing or severe back pain. It concentrates on transforming 
the adverse job conditions that could inflict physical damages to workers into 
a friendlier configuration that will keep workers within their natural physio- 
logical inclinations (Chaffin and Andersson, 1984) to better handle work stress 
and to maintain physical health. Work-place ergonomics, thereby, advances 
the idea of fitting jobs to workers, not workers to jobs. 
In this paper we view “ergonomics” as a set of technologies for improving 
the workplace and as an interesting example of technological innovation in the 
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workplace. While technology is often thought of as hard tools and equipment, 
Tornatzky and Fleischer (1990, p. 12) define technology more broadly as “tools 
or tool systems by which we transform parts of our environment, derived from 
human knowledge, to be used for human purposes”. In accordance with this 
definition of technology, ergonomics as a field of academic inquiry has devel- 
oped a scientifically based set of tools for transforming the workplace so it is 
more suitable for humans in the system, mainly from physical and psychom- 
otor perspectives. The available ergonomics tools range from biomechanical 
lifting criteria to psychophysical and metabolic work criteria (Chaffin and Ay- 
oub, 1975; Garg and Ayoub, 1980). 
The literature on implementation of technology more generally is both vo- 
luminous and heterogeneous (see Tornatzky and Fleischer (1990) and 
Majchrzak (1988) for reviews). Quite often, this literature focuses on one level 
of analysis. For example, there are numerous studies which look at the effects 
of user participation in the implementation of some form of information tech- 
nology (King and Rodriguez, 1981; Baroudi et al., 1986; Franz and Robey, 1986)) 
but these studies stay at the level of the individual user providing little under- 
standing of the broader organizational processes involved. There have also 
been studies that look at the characteristics of firms (e.g., size, formalization, 
core technology) that predict their adoption and implementation of technol- 
ogy (e.g., Collins et al., 1988; Collins et al., 1992), but these studies generally 
stay at the organizational level and make little sense of the internal dynamics 
of the firm. 
There is, of course, literature that discusses the within-organizational dy- 
namics of technology implementation. Tornatzky and Fleischer (1990, Chap. 
9) summarize the literature in this area. They present four different perspec- 
tives on technology implementation: the technocentric perspective, which fo- 
cuses only on the technical aspect of technology; the sociocentric perspective, 
based on the organization development (OD ) tradition; the conflict/bargain- 
ing perspective, which addresses the political dynamics of implementation; 
and the systems design perspective. What is notable in this summarization is 
Tornatzky and Fleischer’s choice of level of analysis. They choose a-priori the 
level of organization as the level of analysis, arguing that it subsumes all levels 
below. Indeed, this broad-brushing of all intra-organizational dynamics under 
the level of organization tends to be a general tendency of the literature in this 
area. For example, Walton (1989) develops a model of information technology 
implementation based on a wide range of case examples. His model can also be 
called an organizational level model because to develop it he uses data from 
individual level to organizational level. An explicit differentiation and integra- 
tion among the different levels within organization seems to be lacking. 
The explicit differentiation of intra-organizational levels is crucial in avoid- 
ing “biases of misspecification and aggregation” (Rousseau, 1985). For ex- 
ample, it would be wrong to mix managerial-level with organizational-level 
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phenomena or to assume managerial-level phenomena apply at the worker level. 
In our model, we make distinctions among processes at three different levels 
within organizations. We distinguish processes with manifest consequences for 
individual workers, those for middle-level actors, and those for top union and 
management leadership. The individuals signify workers whose jobs are ulti- 
mately affected by the process; the middle-level actors signify implementers 
who analyze jobs, design the necessary changes, and oversee the implementa- 
tion; and top leadership means plant-level management and/or local union 
leaders. 
We first separately discuss the impact of exogenous pressures on these three 
levels-top leadership, implementers, and workers. Then these separate dis- 
cussions are joined into an overall process model as we discuss the effects phe- 
nomena at one level have on those at another. We call variables that affect 
variables at different organizational levels “cross-level” variables, and the 
overall process model the cross-level model. 
Our research method is largely inductive, taking a grounded theory approach 
(i.e., Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Miles and Huberman, 1984; Patton, 1988; Ei- 
senhardt, 1989; Yin, 1989). The method was viewed as appropriate because 
ergonomics is a relatively new technology, at least in practice, which has not 
been extensively studied from an organizational perspective (Hendrick, 1986; 
Geirland, 1989). Thus, our focus is on building an empirically-based model of 
the process of implementation (Strauss and Corbin, 1990)) not on the statis- 
tical verification of hypotheses. 
Following the logic of induction, we describe the research process first and 
propose our model second. We realize that this leads to a non-traditional paper 
flow, but it seems most compatible with the logic of grounded theory. In ac- 
cordance with Eisenhardt’s (1989) recommendation, we relate emergent con- 
cepts to prominent existing theories (e.g., institutional theory (Meyer and Ro- 
wan, 1977), enactment theory (Weick, 1979), theories of participative 




This paper examines the process of implementation of work-place ergon- 
omics within the plants of the largest division of an automobile manufacturing 
firm. This division is responsible for body stampings, final vehicle assembly, 
and some trim items and had been in pursuit of ergonomics since 1983. The 
division and corporate management as well as the national union promoted 
the general value of ergonomics to plants. The plants were urged, but not re- 
quired, to implement ergonomics programs. Our research took place in the fall 
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of 1988, just prior to the launching of a corporate-wide, mandatory program in 
December of that year. Thus, we studied the implementation process within 
the period when the adoption was voluntary at the plant level. 
As Tornatzky and Fleischer (1990) point out, the boundary between adop- 
tion and implementation is fuzzy. In our study the thing to be adopted and 
implemented was an ergonomics program. We view plants as having “adopted” 
an ergonomics program when the plant leadership (generally management 
working with union leaders) decided to set up an ergonomics program and 
assigned ergonomics to some formal structure. Thus, charging an industrial 
engineer with the task of applying ergonomics or setting up a committee to 
work on ergonomics would both mark the adoption of an “ergonomics pro- 
gram”. The processes that occurred within the plant from this point on to 
apply ergonomics knowledge and tools to the design and improvement of jobs 
are all viewed in this study as part of implementation of the ergonomics 
program. 
The implementation activities of ergonomics entailed improving adverse job 
conditions. They were largely focused on the redesign of existing jobs. Ergon- 
omics considerations can, at least in theory, come into play either at the initial 
design phase of the workstation layout or at the redesign phase while the work 
is in process. Whereas improving at the design phase is highly recommended 
(Joseph, 1986), it often does not happen that way, especially in an organiza- 
tional context with an extensive division of labor among engineering special- 
ists in which human factors specialists (if they exist) are among the least pow- 
erful actors. (See Perrow (1983) for a discussion of the general state of human 
factors engineering.) 
We, therefore, focus the scope of our inquiry only on those improvements at 
the redesign phase, after the plant operation was already set up and in produc- 
tion. Virtually all of the activities of the implementers revolved around the 
redesign of existing jobs. Some plants systematically worked their way through 
production lines, generally finding some opportunity for improvement on each 
job, while others focused only on selected jobs known as “problem jobs”, while 
still others picked a few generic improvements that would affect a large portion 
of the workforce. 
All plants were unionized and were represented by the United Auto Workers 
(UAW). The level of involvement of local union leadership varied. The plant- 
level union in most cases was in some way involved in the implementation 
process at all three organizational levels. The union generally sympathized 
with the humane goals of ergonomics, while showing some concern over the 
potential for management to use ergonomics to justify head count reduction or 
tighter production standards. Even in some cases where the plant-level man- 
agement and union had a traditional, adversarial relationship, the union at 
least took a “hands-off” approach to the ergonomics program and did not hinder 
in any major way the process of implementation. We observed in general that 
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the level of involvement of the line workers in the implementation process was 
directly proportional to the level of the local union support. 
3.2. Organizations and informants 
Thirteen plants constituted the sample for our investigation. Each plant 
selected for this research met one simple criterion - it was known to have 
adopted a formal ergonomics program (beyond simply sending people to train- 
ing) in the period between 1983 and 1988. A division-level internal audit of 
ergonomics programs had been conducted by the company just prior to our 
study and was provided to us as a basis for sample selection. There were 17 
plants identified as having some formal ergonomics program, and 13 of these 
plants were included in our study. The four plants we did not include were 
those that did not respond to our letters and phone calls. We acknowledge that 
our theory building effort may suffer from having truncated the sample by not 
including the plants that did not adopt ergonomics. We chose plants with ex- 
isting ergonomics program mainly because we were more interested in building 
a theory of implementation than a theory of adoption. 
Summary data on the 13 plants are presented in Table 1.’ The sample plants 
ranged from plants which made fewer than 5 job changes as a result of the 
ergonomics program to plants which made over 100 job changes. The age of 
the programs as of 1988 ranged from 2 years to 5 years. As shown, plants Sl to 
S5 were Stamping plants that stamped out car body panels and structural 
members and welded parts together; plants Al to A7 were Assembly plants 
that assembled parts and painted final automobiles; and plant Tl was a Trim 
plant which sewed and assembled automotive seats. 
Despite the difference in the number of years into the program, all plants 
had sent some people to corporate-sponsored ergonomics training, set up some 
formal structure (or assigned ergonomics to an existing structure) and as a 
result had done some work on ergonomics. The plants chose different ways to 
organize their ergonomics programs since the division usually gave no advice 
on how to structure their programs. This meant that we were going to observe 
a wide variety of implementation styles. The consequences of these varied im- 
plementation experiences was what we were seeking to understand. 
A few of the plants had very recently (within the six months prior to our 
visit) reorganized their ergonomics programs in anticipation of the new cor- 
porate-level program which explicitly specified the use of ergonomics commit- 
tees including equal union and management representation. In all of these 
cases the committees had rarely met and accomplished little by the time of our 
interviews (e.g., they had been trained but did not meet during summer 
‘The names of the plants have been coded to insure anonymity. The assigned numbers will cor- 
respond to each respective plant in the remainder of this paper. 
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TABLE 1 
Overview of 13 auto manufacturing plants 
Plants Top Approximate Approximate First year of Number of 
leadership number of number of ergonomic ergonomics informants 





























3 1 generic change 
> 100 unique changes’ 
2 unique changes 
1 generic changed 
1 unique change 
10 unique changes 
< 5 unique changes 
> 150 unique changes 
> 150 unique changes 
10 unique changes 
5 unique changes 
1 generic change 
30 unique changes 
1 generic change 
2 generic changes 
5 unique changes 














“Top leadership refers to management leadership and/or local union leadership. 
‘Implementers refer to all people in the plant directly involved in redesigning the jobs and acquir- 
ing resources for the actual implementation. 
‘Unique change implies individually-tailored changes for each job. 
dGeneric change implies a type of change that affects a group of jobs. 
“This is the number of the original ergonomics implementers in this plant, before the agenda of 
ergonomics was absorbed by the automation committee in 1984. 
‘At this plant, three projects were selected and one implementer was assigned to each project. Only 
one of the three projects was actually implemented. 
changeover to a new car line). Thus, in these cases we focused on the organi- 
zation and outcomes of the program prior to the reorganization. 
To pave the way for our research, a division-level executive sent each plant 
a letter stating that we would be contacting them for the purpose of gathering 
information on their ergonomics program. Lest plants should be reluctant to 
cooperate, the letter stated clearly that our visit was not intended to be an audit 
of their program. Subsequent phone calls were placed to each plant by the 
researchers to set up mutually acceptable visitation dates and to gather initial 
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data on its program structure and key actors. Plants were asked to identify and 
provide all key actors involved in their ergonomics program for interviews. 
3.3. Data sources 
All data were gathered in visits to the plants in 1988. Thus, data collection 
was retrospective. This research relied primarily on three data sources: (1) 
semistructured interviews, (2) documents, and (3) observations. 
Semistructured interviews 
An interview tool was developed, based on our early experience with a stamp- 
ing plant and an assembly plant (discussed below) with which the university 
had been involved in developing an ergonomics program (Liker et al., 1989). 
It consisted of 15 open-ended question categories, focusing on various aspects 
of the program process. There was no fixed wording used to inquire about these 
variables. We let the conversation flow at its own pace, and since this was an 
inductive study, we often pursued unexpected, but interesting lines of discus- 
sion (e.g. Sutton and Callahan, 1987). However, in the end, we made sure we 
covered all of the variables in our interview tool. The interview process in gen- 
eral lasted from 4 to 8 hours, during which time we would interview one or 
more groups of informants. In several cases we made return visits in order to 
pick up other key informants mentioned by those interviewed. We stopped 
interviewing when no more new information was forthcoming: it marked our 
data saturation point (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). 
Documents 
The ergonomics training records, lists of job changes, minutes taken in the 
ergonomics committee meetings, and memos from the division office were 
gathered and used to add information. Access to these documents was largely 
dependent on the plants’ record keeping effort. 
Observation data 
We were taken on plant tours at all plants to see the ergonomics changes in 
action. We were able to see how some of the changes noted on paper were 
actually implemented or not implemented. We saw how workers responded to 
the changes in some cases and how in other cases, they just ignored the changes 
made. An example of this is workers pushing an ergonomically designed hoist 
off to the side and manually loading a machine. 
Prior involvement with plants 
The second author had prior involvement as a consultant to assembly plant 
Al and one stamping plant Sl (see Liker et al., 1989) helping to develop the 
design of the program and providing graduate student technical support to 
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ergonomics committees. Both of these plants had participative, team-oriented 
programs and were among the most active in making ergonomic improve- 
ments. One might argue that the success of these two plants was attributable 
to the involvement of an outside consultant; however, most of the plants were 
assisted to some degree by university faculty and graduate students acting as 
consultants. For example, the trim plant Tl had extensive faculty involvement 
acting as outside experts and the plant only changed one aspect of the plant - 
seats for sewers - which were intended to be changed anyway. 
3.4. Data analysis 
The method of analysis used here is based on recommendations by Patton 
(1988) of generating initial sets of variables and generating grounded theory 
as described by Glaser and Strauss (1967) and Miles and Huberman (1984). 
The basic approach involved three stages of data collection and analysis: (1) 
transcribing notes of two researchers at the end of each plant visit into a case 
record, (2) forming a theoretical disposition, continuously comparing emerg- 
ing concepts against data, and (3) modifying the theoretical disposition when- 
ever deviations occur. This iterative procedure was repeated until an adequate 
conceptual framework emerged. 
As recommended by Van Maanen (1983) and practiced by Harris and Sut- 
ton ( 1986 ) and Sutton and Callahan ( 1987 ), our analysis was concerned more 
with identifying theoretical elements that were similar across all plants than 
those that remained peculiar to a plant. However, when a case was observed 
that contradicted the general model, the case was not discarded but rather was 
regarded as the source of a new perspective (Poole and Van de Ven, 1989). 
The data analysis consisted of variable definition, coding, bivariate data 
plotting, and model building. First, we identified a set of key variables that 
seemed to distinguish common processes and outcomes at different plants. 
These variables were first nominated as we visited the plants and subsequently 
underwent iterative revisions as more data were collected. We then defined the 
key variables in terms of their bipolar endpoints (e.g., participative versus 
expert driven ) . 
Second, coding was done by both authors who independently classified plants 
on each of the key constructs, then discussed the results, and reached consen- 
sus on the classification of each plant. We found that we could not identify all 
plants as fitting either one or the other pole. For example, when we attempted 
to classify plants as using either expert-driven or participate approaches to job 
design, we found that some plants had a strong degree while others had a mod- 
erate degree of worker participation. We thus distinguished the level of partic- 
ipation into no/weak participation, moderate participation, and strong partic- 
ipation. We also found that some plants used a combination of participative 
and expert-driven approaches so we coded them as having both. The resulting 
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variables and the coding of each of the thirteen plants are shown in Table 2, 
adopting the format of the “cross-site table” recommended by Miles and Hub- 
erman ( 1984 ). We did not attempt to compute inter-rater reliability of the two 
coders as the coding evolved through an iterative process (i.e., coding, discuss- 
ing the results, then recoding, etc. ). We felt for these exploratory purposes the 
benefits of discussion throughout the coding process outweighed the benefits 
of coding all cases independently then computing reliabilities. 
Third, following the advice of Miles and Huberman (1984, Chap. 5) we con- 
structed scatterplots showing the relationship between selected pairs of vari- 
ables. We present examples of these in the Final Process Model (Section 6) to 
highlight a few key relationships (Figs. 2-4). The plotting of each plant was 
based on judgements of where the plants stacked up relative to each other on 
each of the variables coded. On a 2x2 matrix, we marked each axis with a 
variable - the antecedent variable on the vertical axis and the consequent 
variable on the horizontal axis. We then placed each pole of the variables at 
each end of the axes: the bipoles of most of the variables describe a continuum 
(i.e., typically going from one end of a pole to the opposite direction decreasing 
in strength, becoming zero at the mid point, and then increasing in strength 
towards the other pole). The placement of plants in the 2 x 2 space was based 
on our original coding plus judgements as to the relative location of the plants 
with respect to the others. For example, in Fig. 2 Plant 6 was slightly less 
participative than Plant 1 so we placed it slightly toward the expert pole. (See 
Miles and Huberman (1984) for further illustrations of qualitative 
scatterplots. ) 
Fourth, we began to put the related variables together into an overall process 
model. This again was an inductive and iterative process based on a grounded 
theory methodology, not on a deductive multivariate causal modeling approach. 
Despite our efforts to be rigorous in our data analysis, we need, however, to 
qualify the degree of representativeness of our final model in terms of its fit 
with evidence. As discussed above, the final model focuses on the patterns that 
were similar across plants rather than particularistic patterns. As Sutton and 
Callahan (1987) note, we too acknowledge that just as a quantitative re- 
searcher does not expect a set of independent variables to explain 100 percent 
of the variance in a set of dependent variables (Mintzberg, 1979 ), the proposed 
model fits well with the evidence but not perfectly. 
We now start presenting our findings by introducing a model that represents 
the process of ergonomics implementation as four stages. These four stages 
were generic across the top leadership, implementer and worker level so we 
refer to these as the within-level processes. The concept of “stages” is similar 
to Berger and Luckman’s (1967) notion of how the reality of actions is inter- 
nalized by the actors who commit those actions. Once we discuss these stages, 
generic to all three levels, each level will then be discussed independently in a 







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































stages of process and three levels of organization, a final cross-level model will 
be presented. 
4. Four-stage model of within-level processes 
In questioning respondents about the history of their programs we identified 
four sequential stages that occurred overarching all levels within the organi- 
zation. These four within-level stages are included in the model as external 
pressure, enactment, internalization, and institutionalization. We describe 
these stages as though they are deterministic, but in reality different plants 
went through these “stages” in different time spans and the division between 
stages is fuzzy. As stated previously, we were searching for common, not de- 
terministic, tendencies in the plants visited. For example, Mintzberg and Waters 
(1990) describe the strategy-making process as a pattern in a stream of ac- 
tions. We were seeking common patterns, noting interesting variation around 
the common patterns. 
External pressure represents the exogenous impetus for each within-level 
process. Enactment is the immediate action consequence of external pressure 
impinging on each level. Internalization signifies the cognitive process contin- 
gent on the action taken. Institutionalization (Goodman and Dean, 1982) 
means eventual organizational consequences pertaining to each within-level 
process. 
4.1. External pressure 
A process is a flow of events. External pressures with respect to each level 
were exerted to set the flow in motion. As in Parson’s (1960) discussion on the 
process dynamics of a hierarchical organizational structure (i.e., manufactur- 
ing plants), a hierarchically higher organizational level impacted socially as 
well as technically the activities of the lower organizational level. 
External to the manufacturing plants, divisional and national union leaders 
sent corroborating messages in public speeches and internal memos that said 
ergonomics was “a good thing”. The divisional leaders even sponsored training 
available to all plants free of charge. What was interesting in our study was 
that facing these external pressures, the plants seemed to have behaved as if, 
borrowing Scott and Meyer’s (1983) terms, they were in a highly “institution- 
alized sector” rather than in a highly “technical sector”. This was in contrast 
to the observation of Scott and Meyer that manufacturing organizations op- 
erate in a highly technical sector, based on technical rationality. 
When we describe the process of ergonomics adoption as an “institutional 
process”, we mean that the exogenous messages were ambiguous on the exact 
relationship between the adoption of ergonomics and the purported benefits 
such as medical and workman’s compensation cost savings. They provided no 
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documents that proved ergonomic changes will lead to such benefits. Without 
concrete verification, the value of ergonomics took on the shape of “institu- 
tionally legitimated elements” (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and Pow- 
ell, 1983). That is, in the absence of clear scientific evidence of a cause-effect 
relationship between implementing ergonomics and receiving valued benefits, 
plants tended to adopt ergonomics to achieve legitimacy in the eyes of the 
parent organizations - division headquarters and national union. Following 
institutional theory, we call this external pressure on plants the “institutional 
pressure”. 
Consistent with the description by the institutional theorists (i.e., Meyer 
and Rowan, 1977), top leadership conformed by setting up a “formal struc- 
ture”. It instituted a structural set-up to start the implementation process in 
motion, and the implementers got activated subsequent to this structural 
conformity. 
The one plant that did not follow this pattern was Plant S2, an aging stamp- 
ing plant. The plant manager did not buy into ergonomics and take advantage 
of the division-sponsored training or otherwise seem to respond to division 
management pressure. But implementers emerged as self-appointed cham- 
pions of the ergonomics program. The key leader in this case was the appointed 
UAW health and safety representative who had a background in ergonomics 
and was active in human factors professional associations. He took it upon 
himself to contact a professor at a local university, who.was not involved in 
the division-level program, and pay for his consultation through union funds. 
The health and safety representative managed to gain the enthusiastic com- 
mitment of a number of hourly workers who participated on ergonomics com- 
mittees. With a minimum of formal buy-in of their top leadership they were 
actively seeking ergonomic changes. This bottom-up effort was unique enough 
that we single it our for more detailed description in the discussion section 
later in the paper. 
However, in all 13 plants, workers were affected by the dynamics that oc- 
curred at the implementer level. The redesign activities of jobs by implemen- 
ters became the exogenous jolt for the worker-level process. Overall, a form of 
decision at one level prompted movement at the level below. Therefore, this 
organizational decision from a hierarchically higher level is called the external 
pressure for the next level process. 
4.2. Enactment 
The immediate effect of the external pressure on each level is manifested in 
enactment in that level. Consistent with Weick’s (1979) enactment theory, 
action took place first, followed by the internalization of action committed. 
Weick argues that “acting” often precedes “thinking”, contrary to the common 
notion of thinking before acting. Due to their bounded rationality, human beings 
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tend to act first and then bracket a segment of their experience to internalize 
or “make sense” of what has happened. 
This is what we observed in our cases. We were told on many occasions that 
when they got the memo from the division and the union president or heard 
about the ergonomics program at a national meeting, the first thing they did 
was to organize a joint committee (i.e., team consisting of union and manage- 
ment representatives) or to assign ergonomic job changes to a specialist (e.g., 
engineer). It appeared to us that they did not have a lengthy discussion about 
the plant-level purpose of the ergonomics program prior to taking these ac- 
tions. For example, the top managers and the union leaders alike told us that 
they knew that they “didn’t have to do it but still went ahead and did it” be- 
cause they “respect” the person who initiated the memo and what he said. In 
some plants where we made repeated visits, the manager at first could not tell 
us clearly why they started the ergonomics program. As we made more visits, 
his level of articulatation about the goals of their ergonomics program in- 
creased, an indication that rationales followed action. 
At the implementer level, once implementers were trained, enactment took 
place as job design activities. At the worker level, the action was some level of 
involvement in the process, ranging from proactive involvement in the design 
phase to no involvement until the job change was made (see Table 2). Job 
design activities and worker involvement led to subsequent internalization in 
each respective level, which will be discussed in the next section. 
4.3. Internalization 
Internalization at each level involves some sort of mental process contingent 
upon action taken by the actors at that level. Management justified their action 
by retrospectively articulating the goals of their ergonomics program. As shown 
in Table 2, the goal of the ergonomics was expressed in terms of either worker 
health maintenance, cost savings, or some combination. Without publicly ac- 
knowledging that their action was largely due to conformance to institutional 
pressures, they were looking for reasons for having taken actions, or in Weick’s 
(1979) language they were engaged in “retrospective sensemaking”. 
Action taken by the implementers gave rise to internal pressure to keep the 
ergonomics program alive. The internal pressure emerged as a cognitive state 
of being committed (Salancik, 1977) that to a degree bound individual(s) to 
their behavioral acts. When implementers met together (when more than one 
person was involved), their actions reinforced one another and generated 
greater commitment. As indicated in Table 2, in some cases the internal pres- 
sure was confined to one or two individuals, but in others it was extended to a 
group of people. 
Depending on their level of involvement, the worker’s willingness to accept 
the changes seemed to vary (i.e., Kvalseth, 1980; Lawler, 1986). Their attitude 
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toward change is considered internalization at the worker level, based on the 
definition of attitude as a “value conception” applied to a specific object or 
situation (Scott, 1965; Rokeach, 1970). In one plant, the degree of acceptance 
varied between two workers who worked on the same job on different shifts. 
When the day-shift worker was involved, but not the night-shift worker, in 
redesigning of the job on which they worked, the former accepted the change 
willingly but the latter was often disgruntled by it. In other words, the worker’s 
attitude toward a job change was also contingent on the nature of action, in 
this case involvement, taken. We should note that in general workers’ attitudes 
toward the changes were quite positive and overt resistance comparatively rare 
as indicated in Table 2. It seemed that the workers generally saw the changes 
as making their jobs easier and reducing stress. 
4.4. Institutionalization 
As a result of the preceding sequence of events, varying degrees of institu- 
tionalization occurred at each level. We introduce three aspects of institution- 
alization which,parallel closely Goodman and Dean’s (1982) characterization 
of institutionalization of organizational change. We discuss below legitimiza- 
tion, socialized elements, and routinization, while they describe social facts, 
multiple actors, and persistence. 
When the plant leaders authorized the goal of ergonomics, they gave “legit- 
imacy” to ergonomics (i.e., Parsons (1960) discusses how an organizational 
goal leads to legitimization of values associated with that goal). The level of 
legitimacy correlated closely with how easily implementers were able to “bor- 
row” the tooling and maintenance personnel to work on the proposed changes. 
In other words, the more ergonomics was accepted as a “social fact”, the easier 
it was to utilize the necessary resources. 
As implementers met together for discussions and struggled together to in- 
stall the changes, they seemed to have developed a new group culture. Smircich 
( 1983 ) discusses culture as a by-product of people coming together and sharing 
a system of social cognition. The emergence of this group culture was mani- 
fested as new “socialized elements” closely linked to implementation activi- 
ties. The socialized elements were a set of ergonomically specialized language, 
shared stories (good and bad), heuristically understood roles as opposed to 
official titles, ritualistic meetings that they held regularly, and camaraderie 
among implementers (Table 3 shows the rating of these elements with respect 
to each plant). 
As the worker-level consequence, the job changes were installed. Although 
all changes were designed to reduce the physical stress level jobs imposed on 
workers, some changes became institutionalized by becoming a part of the rou- 
tine, but some changes were resisted or ignored by the worker and just “eroded 
away” (Zucker, 1988). 
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TABLE 3 
Cross-plant comparison of socialized elements 
Sl S2 S3 S4 S5 Al A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 Tl 
Specialized 3 3 1 1 1 3 2 2 1 2 3 1 1 
languages 
Shared 3 3 2 113 3 11 2 2 11 
stories 
Indigenous 3 3 2 12 3 3 2 2 2 3 12 
leaders 
Roles 3 2 1113 2 11 2 2 12 
Rituals 3 2 1113 2 111 2 11 
Collectivity 3 3 1 1 1 3 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 
Legend: 1 = weak, 2 = moderate, 3 = strong. 
5. Description of the key process variables 
The variables listed in Table 4 are a subset of those in Table 2. These were 
the variables that were most important in describing the cross-level dynamics 
of the implementation process. We call them the key process variables. They 
have thus far been alluded to in terms of the singular four-stage within-level 
process. In this section, we isolate and discuss these variables more explicitly 
in terms of the three organizational levels. The variables represent for each 
organizational level the first three stages of within-plant process leading up to 
the last stage of institutionalization. For simplicity we treat all key process 
variables as nominal (though most could be viewed on a continuum) and de- 
fine them in terms of their “poles”. We concentrate on the description of these 
variables and leave how these variables are related to each other for the next 
section. 
5.1. Top leadership level 
Structural conformity refers to the ways top leadership responded to external 
pressures (i.e., conformed) to create an ergonomics program. Some plants con- 
formed by setting up a new structure and some by utilizing an existing struc- 
ture. This structural conformity was manifested in two types of structural ar- 
rangements: team structure or specialist structure. In some cases top leadership 
set up a new structure such as a new joint committee (i.e., a cross-functional 
team with both union and management representation), a new specialist po- 
sition (i.e., ergonomist, ergonomics coordinator, etc. ) , or some combination of 
the two. On the other hand, top leadership in some cases added ergonomics to 
the responsibilities of an existing structure, either an existing committee struc- 
ture (e.g., automation committee) or a staff member (e.g., industrial engi- 
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TABLE 4 
List of key process variables 
Level Variables Poles 
Top leadership structural conformity 







new job design 
Worker involvement 
attitude toward change 
initiation of a new program structure 
utilization of an existing program structure 
















neer). The top leadership then related the action to the goal of cost-savings, to 
the enhancement of worker well-being, or to some combination of the two. 
5.2. Implementer level 
Implementers were charged with identifying problematic job designs from 
an ergonomics perspective, which were risk factors that tend to be associated 
with excessive fatigue, soreness, and health problems, and prescribing ways to 
redesign jobs. A participative approach to the job design is defined here as the 
direct inclusion of line workers among the implementers. These line workers, 
who were in fact union members, acted as representatives of their hourly co- 
workers in the plant. In one case where a union-company joint effort was used 
(Plant Sl), the committee eventually reviewed most of the jobs in the plant, 
often inviting the workers whose jobs were being reviewed to the meeting, and 
implemented the necessary changes (see Liker et al. (1990) for more detail). 
In plants that took the expert approach, one or two well-trained implemen- 
ters identified “problem jobs” and devised ways to improve these jobs. Workers 
and top leaders looked to them to provide ergonomics solutions to these jobs. 
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Plant A6 had two such expert implementers who identified ergonomics prob- 
lems, focused on the most prevalent problems in the plant, and offered solu- 
tions that affected most of the jobs in the plant (i.e., shock absorbing gloves 
and floormats ) . 
The qualitative approach to job anaZysis involved brainstorming or informal 
discussion among the implementers about problems with the jobs. It was not 
uncommon for the implementers to probe for ideas from the workers who 
worked on the jobs they were analyzing by inviting them to the meetings or 
through informal conversation. On the other hand, the engineering job anal- 
ysis entailed resorting to more analytic tools to identify problems (e.g., the 
computer modeling packages of work postures and metabolic energy expendi- 
tures ). For example, the particulars of precise worker posture and the weight 
of the load at a problem job would be entered into the computer. The computer 
output would then point out the specific body parts where excessive stress was 
being exerted. 
Implementer-level dedication to the ergonomics program is listed as irzterrzal 
pressure. The internal pressure arose through the action of individuals acting 
alone or groups acting collectively. In Plant A6, where a safety engineer and a 
union representative were assigned to the implementation task, they did not 
work together closely as a team, but they independently made significant con- 
tributions to making ergonomic changes. The safety engineer ran the computer 
analysis program frequently to test the feasibility of the proposed changes and 
also was in charge of distributing ergonomic devices to workers, and the union 
representative administered internal surveys to probe for the need for the pro- 
posed ergonomic changes and made video tapes of their accomplishments. We 
recognize this plant as having strong individual pressure. In Plant Al, on the 
other hand, a group of people (more than 10 as shown in Table 1) worked 
together closely. Initially, there were traditional adversarial relations between 
the management and the local union. But, as people from both sides met to- 
gether to collaborate on making ergonomics changes, they “set aside their dif- 
ferences” and “became a team”. Strong group pressure for the survival and 
expansion of the ergonomics program subsequently emerged. 
As shown in Table 1, new job designs are categorized as either unique or 
generic. When individual jobs were considered in redesign, each job was ana- 
lyzed in a comprehensive way to determine the unique stresses in the particular 
job-person configuration and job changes were designed to address these par- 
ticular stresses. We call these changes unique changes. But some changes in- 
volved the design of generic solutions to problems that affected a set of jobs. 
Some examples are shock absorbing gloves made available to a large portion 
of the workforce, floormats for entire production lines, and ergonomically de- 
signed seats for an entire sewing plant. We call these generic changes. 
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5.3. Worker level 
Worker involvement in changing their own jobs can be either proactive or 
reactive. Proactive involvement entails getting involved in the initial layout 
stage of the job redesign. In Plant Sl, the workers were formally invited to the 
meeting when their jobs were going to be analyzed for possible ergonomics risk 
factors for the first time, prior to any redesign. Reactive involvement, on the 
other hand, means having no involvement until the job change is made. Typ- 
ically in this case, the worker would complain about the change that is imple- 
mented, and the implementers would then try to accomodate the complaint. 
For example, in Plant A2 one specialist was often put in charge of changing 
several jobs and said he could not find enough time to consult the workers in 
advance. It was, therefore, not uncommon for the specialist to redesign a job 
alone and after implementation iron out any worker complaints. Once the 
change was implemented, the worker could either reject the change by resort- 
ing to the old job configuration or accept the change by using the new config- 
uration. One example of rejection we observed was a worker who pushed a new 
ergonomically designed hoist off to one side and loaded and unloaded parts 
without it. Acceptance meant using the new workstation and tools as rede- 
signed. The cognitive stage of preference suggested by these behaviors is re- 
ferred to as the worker’s attitude toward change. 
6. The final process model 
The framework of the process model shown in Table 5 combines the four 
stages and the three organizational levels. All the key process variables shown 
in Table 4 appear in Table 5. All variables appear just as they did in Table 4, 
with one exception of job design activities which reflect two variables in Table 
4, namely, job analysis and design approach. The variables under institution- 
alization stage come from the discussion of the four stage model. Organized 
TABLE 5 
Variables of the process model 
Level/Stages External pressures Enactment Internalization Institutionalization 
Top Leadership institutional structural goal of legitimization 




















with respect to stages and levels, Table 5 serves as a summary of what has been 
discussed in the previous two sections and aids in the building of the final 
process model shown in Fig. 1. 
The final model (Fig. 1) is generated first by rotating Table 5 at 45 degrees 
so that the external pressure variable of each level comes directly under the 
action variable of the preceding level. Arrows are then added to indicate the 
direction of the process. Following Burgelman’s (1983) convention in his pro- 
cess model of internal corporate venturing, the solid arrows represent the flow 
of main activities and the shaded arrows indicate delayed, peripheral effects. 
The main activities reflect the direct process of ergonomics implementation 
beginning with structural conformity at the leadership level to ergonomic job 
changes at the worker level. Delayed effects represent the peripheral organi- 
zational processes that happened subsequent to the main process. The delayed 
effect shows the institutionalization process in the leadership and implemen- 
ter levels. 
Notice that each key variable under external pressure, enactment, and in- 
ternalization is measured in terms of the two poles as discussed in the previous 
section and shown in Table 4. Depending on the strength of each pole of these 
variables, different paths leading to different outcomes were observed. Since 
where each plant stood on each of these variables played important roles in the 
eventual implementation process, readers may want to refer back to Table 2 
while reading through this section. 
When plants that displayed similar antecedent conditions were grouped to- 
gether, a common pattern leading to common outcomes began to emerge. As 
each plant process told a story, the 13 stories together began to tell a grand 
story of the general process model in Fig. 1. We first discuss the primary se- 
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Fig. 1. The process model. Solid arrows represent the main process, shaded arrows depict delayed 
effects in the process. (Notes: (i) Job Design Activities includes the job analysis (qualitative vs. 
engineering) and design approach (participative vs. expert). (ii) The process of three plants ends 
at Structural Arrangement. (iii) The process of one plant starts from Internal Pressure.) 
quence of activities indicated by the solid arrows, followed by the delayed ef- 
fects indicated by the shaded arrows. 
6.1. Sequence of main activities 
The sequence of activities considered here reflects processes internal to 
plants. As mentioned earlier, these internal processes were set in motion as 
plants accepted, to varying degrees, the institutional values of ergonomics. The 
main activities constitute paths leading from institutional pressure to ergon- 
omic job changes. 
Top leadership level 
Once the process was set in motion, the manner of structural conformity, 
whether a new program structure or an existing structure, played a crucial role 
in the subsequent processes. Out of the twelve plants whose program was ex- 
ternally induced, nine plants formed a new structure and three plants (Plants 
S4, S5, and A7) used an existing structure. When a new structure was formed, 
whether it was a team or a staff, the ergonomics program seemed to have gained 
a brand new identify and internal legitimacy. In this case, the program was 
looked upon (though sometimes with skepticism ) as an “up and coming thing” 
and something that had top leadership’s “blessing”. 
On the other hand, we observed that in the three plants that utilized an 
existing structure ergonomics got little to no priority. The existing structure 
already had its customary agenda to carry out, which in the three cases studied 
continued to be the main priority. Most of the purported ergonomic job changes 
at these three plants were really not motivated by ergonomics considerations 
but rather were traditional productivity changes that only got labeled as er- 
gonomic changes retrospectively. For example, at Plant A7, ergonomics was 
assigned to their “automation committee”, made up mainly of engineers who 
were sent to ergonomics training. We examined a list of their proposed and 
implemented projects and many were labeled as ergonomics projects. Every 
“ergonomics project” that was implemented was an automation project which 
could be cost justified in labor savings. Other ergonomics projects that could 
not be cost justified in this way were labeled as “closed” (a decision was made 
not to make the change). 
In the model, these three plants are regarded as having no further process 
beyond assigning ergonomics to existing structures; their process of ergon- 
omics dissemination ended at structural arrangement. In these cases, manage- 
ment’s response to institutional pressure was to symbolically conform -they 
could point to an “ergonomics program” which in reality lacked ergonomic 
substance. As Meyer and Rowan (1977) would predict, structural conformity 
was “decoupled” from daily activities. 
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Implementer level 
Once a new structure was established, the stage was set for the ensuing er- 
gonomics processes. A scatterplot between the type of structural arrangement 
and the form of design approach is plotted and shown in Fig. 2. (Recall design 
approach and job analysis together constitute job design activities.) There ap- 
pears a rather clear trend, a positive correlation. The stronger the team set- 
up, the stronger the participative design activities; and the stronger the spe- 
cialist set-up, the stronger the expert design activities. Another similar scat- 
terplot (not shown here) revealed a positive trend between the design approach 
and the job analysis. It showed that a strong participative approach is associ- 
ated with using a qualitative approach to job analysis (i.e., relying on members’ 
judgements), whereas the expert activities are associated with the engineering 
approach (i.e., using formal methods such as computer models). In sum, the 
team setup generally led to qualitative analysis, and the specialist setup led to 
formal engineering analysis. 
This relationship was somewhat puzzling to us, mainly because the team 
structure always included technical personnel (i.e., industrial engineers) who 
could easily utilize the various types of engineering techniques. We later real- 
ized that this was related to the style of the justification rationale imposed on 
the implementers by top leadership. When a team structure was used, top man- 
agement seemed to be more willing to accept a qualitative justification ration- 















Fig. 2. Structural arrangement versus job design approaches. 
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dividually to ergonomics generally were under pressure to justify their 
recommendations with hard data from formal engineering analysis. We spec- 
ulate on the reasons for this in the discussion section. 
The scatterplot in Fig. 3 shows an interesting trend, a positive relationship 
between design approach at the implementer level and the types of ergonomic 
job changes. When the implementation process involved strong participative 
activities, as it did in three cases (Plants Sl, Al, and A2), it induced a large 
number of unique changes at the worker level. For example, the participative 
program in Plant Sl went through one production line at a time and evaluated 
each and every job individually for ergonomics risk factors. Based on this eval- 
uation, each job was individually redesigned, using solutions such as custom- 
ized tilt stands and relocated palm buttons. 
When an expert approach was prevalent in the implementation, one or two 
widespread generic changes were more typically implemented at the worker 
level. An example of a generic change is the redesign of chairs for seamsters 
who sewed seat cushions in the trim plant (Plant Tl ). Over 90% of the workers 
in the plant were affected by this change. Other ergonomics projects in this 
plant included controlled experimental investigations to choose the best floor 
mats for workers who had to stand to do their jobs, as well as studies of gloves. 












Fig. 3. Job changes versus design approaches. 
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trial engineer in this plant became personally committed to ergonomics as she 
had a background as a line worker. She identified a number of jobs that re- 
quired unique changes but was never able to put together the support to sys- 
tematically evaluate and redesign those jobs--the efforts of the plant ended at 
generic changes. We also discuss this interesting finding later in the paper. 
Worker-level 
Steps between the new job design and the final outcome of implemented job 
changes are distinguished by the type of involvement of workers leading to 
workers’ accepting or rejecting attitude toward change. (As mentioned earlier, 
what we actually observed was behavioral acceptance or rejection of the 
changes). During plant tours, we observed many times that “implemented” 
changed were not being used by the workers. For example, a localized rail to 
transport parts or a new power tool designed for less torque was being ignored 
by the workers. We discovered that these were almost always engineering 
changes that involved minimal or no upfront involvement of workers. On the 
other hand, when we saw changes in use, someone (i.e., line worker) was often 
eager to point out whose idea (i.e., one of the other line workers) it was in the 
first place and elaborate on the “cleverness” of the idea. 
As many scholars (see Ives and Olsen (1984) for a review in the case of 
information technology) have observed, the higher the proactive involvement 
of workers, the higher the rate of acceptance of the changes installed. In fact, 
this was shown to be true in a statistical comparison of ergonomic job changes 
in a separate study of two automotive engine plants, one which used proactive 
worker participation and one which did not (Orta-Anes, 1991). In the non- 
participative plant workers resisted the change in 23 percent of the cases com- 
pared to 2 percent in the participative plant. In the case of the non-participa- 
tive plant 67 percent of the workers who initially resisted the change ultimately 
accepted the change once they had an opportunity to participate in redesign 
decisions. 
6.2. Delayed effects 
There are several delayed effects in the model. These effects are peripheral 
to the main process described above but are important in their own right. The 
discussion of these effects will be presented in the order of goal of ergonomics, 
legitimation of ergonomics, internal pressure, and new socialized elements. 
Goal of ergonomics 
The common characteristic of the plants that had worker health improve- 
ment as the goal of ergonomics was to require little to no formal justification 
for the expenditure of resources (i.e., Plants Sl, Al). For these plants the 
justification was belief-based in that the top leadership merely repeated the 
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initial belief that ergonomics was “a good thing” for the workers. The imple- 
menters did not have to justify the expenditure “with numbers” as long as it 
was for ergonomics (unless it was a very large expenditure ) . But when the goal 
was cost savings, the top leadership adopted a rationality-based approach. Al- 
though they had not been able to definitely pinpoint and quantify the benefits 
of ergonomics implementation (by their own admission), these plants yet tried 
to prove the expenditure typically by evaluating Workman’s Compensation 
Claim records, medical records, safety records, survey results, etc. Document- 
ing benefits was difficult for these plants because human factors issues are not 
easily quantifiable (Perrow, 1983). For example, in the case of the cumulative 
trauma disorders (CTD) there are significant time delays between cause and 
effect and typically competing explanations for causes (e.g., work-induced so- 
reness versus the results of too much tennis playing or fly-fishing). 
Legitimization of ergonomics 
Legitimization is often described as one of the key consequences of an insti- 
tutionalization process (i.e., Zucker, 1987). According to Parsons (1960)) leg- 
itimization takes place in the direction of a system’s value orientation. In the 
plants studied, the value orientation was first reflected in the goal of ergon- 
omics publicized by the top leadership. Depending on the type of the goal, the 
ergonomics program gained legitimacy among the management leaders or 
among both the local union and management leaders. When the goal was purely 
cost-related (i.e., Plant A7), the perceived legitimacy of ergonomics was lim- 
ited to the management side of the leaders. The local union leaders in Plant 
A7 would have “no part of it”. On the other hand, when the goal emphasized 
worker health, the ergonomics program gained more overarching support and 
legitimacy from both the union and management. 
The jointedness between the local union and management seemed to have 
been a key factor in establishing the local plant environment for ergonomics 
implementation. For example, when a group of people was assigned to the im- 
plementation, without the local union being part of the plant leadership which 
legitimated ergonomics, the activities were largely limited to one or two indi- 
viduals making sporadic changes (i.e., Plant A3 ). All plants with strong inter- 
nal pressure (either group or individual) showed some level of jointedness be- 
tween the local union and management. 
Internal pressure 
As mentioned earlier we distinguish individual pressure from group pressure 
within ergonomics implementers. Typically, a team structure coupled with 
strong union-management jointedness led to a participative approach. The 
participative approach then gave rise to strong internal group pressure. As 
shown in Fig. 4, a participative (versus expert) approach to job design was 










Fig. 4. Job design approaches versus internal pressure. 
In Plant S2 where the internal pressure was indigenous, rather than exoge- 
nous as in the other 12 plants, their ergonomics process started with internal 
pressure. A group of energetic dedicated implementers were collectively taking 
the leadership role and “fighting and scratching” to make the changes. The 
implementation process was largely participative but also had some engineer- 
ing flavor when analyzing jobs (see Table 2). The reason for this latter flavor 
may be due to the fact that the implementers were still trying to gain official 
support of the top leadership, and showing the job improvement results in 
terms of engineering perspectives was perceived as the way to gain that support. 
The structural arrangement of specialist setup led to an expert approach 
which generally gave rise to strong internal individual pressure. For example, 
the top leadership of Plant A6 appointed one safety engineer and one union 
representative to act as their ergonomics specialist. The top leadership of the 
plant designated an existing joint health and safety committee as the steering 
committee for the program. The design activities had to be reported monthly 
and approved by the Steering Committee which the engineering and union 
representative found “cumbersome and frustrating.“Despite this bottleneck, 
the two implementers worked hard to make changes, exhibiting strong indi- 
vidual pressure in the process. 
New socialized elements 
As for internal pressures for change, internal individual pressure did not lead 
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staff members involved. On the other hand, the results of the internal group 
pressure were much more colorful. It went further to the development of new 
socialized elements. As people met and worked on projects together outside of 
their routine production activities, they began sharing common experiences 
related to various change efforts (e.g., the successes and the failures) as well 
as sharing a common ergonomics language (e.g., biomechanical model, repet- 
itive trauma, energy expenditure, etc. ). In Plant Sl, the cross-functional task 
force in one area of the plant was led by an industrial engineer. Workers in the 
plant playfully chided him referring to him as the “stopwatch man”, (despite 
the fact that time standards were no longer set using a stopwatch). Histori- 
cally, workers and the industrial engineer had been adversaries who would 
never think of working cooperatively. Task force members, staff and workers, 
in these cases often became committed to ergonomics to the extent of having 
almost religious passion about the need to spread the word. 
A more structured view of the process of socialization can be obtained from 
Table 3 (Section 4.4). When the scores in Table 3 are rearranged from high 
numbers to low numbers with respect to each plant, a pattern appears. The 
pattern reveals a fairly strong ordering in the development of socialized ele- 
ments: first leaders, then roles, languages and stories, and lastly collectivities 
and rituals. This is consistent with our own impressions of what happened: the 
indigenous leaders appear first, often independent of the official structural 
setup; then the implementers begin to develop roles and start to share similar 
language and stories; and they finally reach a stage of collectivity and rituali- 
zation as we saw in a few plants such as Plants Sl and Al. Furthermore, com- 
parison of Table 1 and Table 3 reveals that the socialized elements were more 
closely related to the strong internal group pressure than the historical longev- 
ity of the ergonomics program. Plants that had older, engineering-based pro- 
grams did not exhibit as much development of socialized elements compared 
to plants that had a shorter program history yet stronger group pressure. 
We have discussed thusfar the sequential dynamics leading to legitimization 
of ergonomics at the top leadership level, new socialized elements at the im- 
plementer level, and job changes at the worker level. Note that we have done 
this by grouping together similar early approaches among plants and by ob- 
serving that these groupings were closely related to certain types of interme- 
diate processes as well as to final outcomes. 
7. Discussion 
The empirical basis for this paper was the implementation of work-place 
ergonomics in thirteen plants in the same division of a large automotive com- 
pany. A model representing the implementation process was developed based 
on a grounded theory approach. To introduce this model, four sequential stages 
of within-level process were discussed first, and key process variables in each 
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of the three levels of analysis were discussed next. The four stages and three 
levels of analysis were then combined to form a table of variables which became 
the building blocks of the final model. The final model describes the key vari- 
ables and flow of presence of work-place ergonomics implementation observed 
in these thirteen plants. We now recapitulate and highlight in more detail the 
key lessons and theoretical implications of this model. 
7.1. Ergonomics adoption as a value-laden process 
The key impetus for ergonomics adoption came, not from a market-driven 
rationale, but from a value-driven rationale at the division level. Despite the 
fact that they were manufacturing plants known for their bureaucratic enter- 
prises in which new technologies are adopted in an “objective” and “calcula- 
ble” manner (Weber, 1946, p. 125) to overcome competition and to meet mar- 
ket demand (Mansfield, 1968; Mansfield et al., 1977), the plants adopted 
ergonomics based on institutional, value-laden exogenous messages. The di- 
visional offices and the national union consistently sent corroborating mes- 
sages that they urged plants to adopt ergonomics because it was “a good thing” 
for the workers and “other” plant operations. How ergonomics could exactly 
benefit the overall plant operation was still quite ambiguous to plants, but what 
was clear was that the divisional offices and the national union valued ergon- 
omics. Plants, therefore, began to adopt ergonomics by conforming with this 
institutionally legitimated notion of ergonomics as “a good thing”. 
It was, then, institutional motivations which were the impetus for the adop- 
tion of ergonomics, not Weberian rationalistic motivations. Based on Di- 
Maggio and Powell’s discussion ( 1983 ), institutional motivations arise, not 
from an organization’s desire to meet market demand, but from its desire to 
gain legitimacy from its political as well as value-promoting organizational 
environment. By value laden we do not necessarily mean that any of the adopt- 
ing plants were only motivated to protect the well being of their workers. Even 
at Plant Sl, one of the most active ergonomics programs with a highly publi- 
cized goal of worker welfare, the plant manager admitted to us in private that 
his major reason for being interested in the program was to gain legitimacy in 
the eyes of division-level management. (His plant was several times targeted 
to be shut down and business was being reduced. By becoming a model citizen 
the plant had managed to stay open for at least a decade after it was targeted 
to be closed - it remains operating at the time of this writing though with a 
very much reduced production volume and workforce compared to its peak.) 
Conformity to external pressures occurred as plants succumbed to varying de- 
grees to the institutional values of ergonomics. 
The plant leadership was then left with the task of explaining to their inter- 
nal stakeholders what they intended to accomplish with ergonomics. (Had the 
adoption been mandatory, it would have been easy to explain: they could have 
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merely said that they were told to do this.) The plant leadership eventually 
used two types of internal goals for ergonomics. One type of goal was the im- 
provement of worker welfare, by simply stating that ergonomics is “a good 
thing” for the workers. The other type of goal elaborated on “other” benefits 
of ergonomics. Although no one really knew exactly what these “other” bene- 
fits entailed, some plants believed that implementing ergonomics would help 
reduce workers’ compensation and medical costs or improve quality. It is, how- 
ever, important to note that these were largely unsubstantiated claims, in that 
they were never verified in business documents or statistical study. They were, 
in essence, a type of rational myth (Meyer and Rowan, 1977): purported ben- 
efits were myths yet became the rational goal of ergonomics. In sum, two types 
of internal goals were used: worker welfare and cost savings. We discuss in the 
next section the impact of these two goals on the overall implementation 
process. 
7.2. Goals of ergonomics 
The plants with a worker welfare goal in general tended to be much more 
active in implementing ergonomics than the plants with a cost savings goal. 
The plants that told us they implemented ergonomics simply because they felt 
it was a good thing for the workers were much more vigorous and persistent in 
their efforts to implement ergonomic job changes. On the other hand, plants 
that told us that they implemented changes to improve the “bottom line” 
showed sporadic and intermittent implementation efforts. 
One reason for this may be the differing ways of justifying the expenditures 
in making changes. For the implementers of the plants that adopted the prin- 
ciple that ergonomics was a good thing for the workers, all they had to do to 
justify the expenditure (for modest expenses) was to state that it was for er- 
gonomics. But for the implementers that worked for plants that emphasized 
economic benefits of ergonomics, they had to cost-justify even inexpensive 
changes. It seemed that this extra step impeded the implementation process, 
creating a time-consuming bureaucratic process which often led to rejection of 
the request. We are not suggesting that cost-benefit analysis is always bad for 
technology implementation, but we are saying that, in the case of ergonomics, 
focusing on economic benefits and requiring economic justifications for new 
change projects actually hindered the implementation process. 
We have emphasized that a characteristic of ergonomics is difficulty in 
measuring benefits and causally attributing benefits to ergonomics changes. 
However, this is not a characteristic that is unique to ergonomics. Many new 
technologies have a variety of intangible benefits that are not clear or calcul- 
able (Goldhar and Jelinek, 1983; Dean, 1987). For example, the introduction 
of flexible manufacturing systems might have some direct labor savings but 
the more substantial benefits are apt to be intangibles such as increasing the 
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“flexibility” of the system and thereby leading potentially to increased market 
share, customer satisfaction, and even making the difference between long- 
term survival versus going out of business (Ettlie, 1988; Tombak and Mey, 
1988). 
7.3. Utilizing old structure versus new structure 
Plants either assigned ergonomics to an existing job function or committee 
or created a new structure for ergonomics. In the case of new structures, the 
level of ergonomic job changes varied among plants from 5 to 10 changes to 
more than 100 changes, but there were virtually no ergonomically motivated 
job changes in the plants that utilized existing structures. 
Out of 13 plants, 10 plants had a newly organized ergonomics committee or 
a newly appointed ergonomics coordinator or ergonomist. But 3 plants (Plants 
S4, S5, A7) utilized an existing structure. One of these plants (Plant A7) uti- 
lized its automation committee, and the other two utilized their industrial en- 
gineers. These entities, however, already had a working agenda associated with 
their roles. The committee was busy making automation changes and indus- 
trial engineers were preoccupied with making traditional engineering changes. 
Only when the changes they had made happened to resemble ergonomics-re- 
lated changes, were they then labeled as such, retrospectively. For all practical 
purposes, the adoption of ergonomics at these plants made no real impact. 
7.4. Participative approach versus expert approach 
The participative approach was associated with implementing unique 
changes, changes customized to the unique conditions of each job. The expert 
approach was associated with implementing generic changes, changes not tai- 
lor-made for each job but applied to a larger set of jobs. There are a number of 
possible explanations for this phenomenon. 
One explanation views the distinction between generic and unique changes 
as a reflection of the commitment of management and perhaps of the imple- 
menters. The ergonomics training courses suggested that a rigorous job anal- 
ysis procedure be used for each job looking at the job as a system of interrelated 
parts. However, doing this on a job-by-job basis is tedious and may be hard to 
justify economically. To get the largest payback, monetarily and in visibility, 
it is probably better to focus on generic changes. Thus, with perhaps little more 
effort than it takes to evaluate and improve an individual job, one can affect 
many jobs in the plant (e.g, installing new seats for the entire plant). We are 
not suggesting that one type of change is necessarily better than the other for 
the overall plant operation; however, we are arguing that the generic approach 
can be achieved with less commitment and it becomes easier to document an 
ample return on investment. 
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For example, in Plant A6 where generic changes were made (i.e., replacing 
floor mats to reduce feet soreness) the implementers documented absenteeism 
before and after the change and were able to show a significant reduction in 
absenteeism which justified the cost of the expenditure. No particular com- 
mitment to ergonomics was necessary on the part of plant management to fund 
the improvement and the implementers received notoriety. Even in the case of 
the seat redesign in Plant Tl, the management planned on replacing the seats, 
which were very old anyway, so investing in the design of ergonomically correct 
seats required little marginal investment. Recall that in this case plant man- 
agement was not willing to support unique changes identified by an engineer 
who was particularly passionate about ergonomics. 
A second, and perhaps complimentary, explanation is that the participative 
approach created more diversity than the engineering approach. A greater va- 
riety of opinions, ideas, and human resources to better deal with varied prob- 
lem jobs in the work environment was present in the participative approach. 
In other words, ample “requisite variety” was present to deal with the com- 
plexity of the work environment (Conant and Ashby, 1970; Weick, 1979) and 
to produce unique changes. On the other hand, the expert approach by the 
engineering staff was initially intended to implement changes based on estab- 
lished engineering principles. One might say, however, that their requisite va- 
riety was more limited than in the participative approach and their scope of 
consideration was bounded. Their scope was bounded by their own rationality 
(Simon, 1976), the limited information they had at their disposal, and top 
leadership’s close scrutiny. Their effort to be completely knowledgeable and 
anticipating of consequences of job changes actually limited them to making 
only a few generic changes, and to ignore unique changes affecting particular 
jobs. 
We learned further that the participative versus expert approach made a 
difference in the job analysis approach. In general, when individual experts 
were assigned to ergonomics they were more likely to use formal analytic pro- 
cedures such as computer models. By contrast, joint teams tended not to use 
these formal tools despite the fact that engineers were on the committee. We 
believe this reflects the goals of the plant leadership. Generally, they did not 
set up a participative approach unless a major goal of the ergonomics program 
was to benefit worker health. In this case they would approve moderate ex- 
penses for projects simply because they made sense ergonomically. For exam- 
ple, at Plant Al, the joint committees actually had a graduate student attend- 
ing every meeting who was willing to do the job analysis on the computer and 
report the results to the committee. Most often they felt the analysis was un- 
necessary. They only requested it in borderline cases or when the expense was 
sufficiently high that they felt they needed formal justification to request funds 
from management. On the other hand, managers who assigned expert staff to 
ergonomics were generally after cost reduction and closely scrutinized the costs 
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and calculable benefits of each change. This did put pressure on the imple- 
menters to document the rationale for all ergonomics projects. Since clearly 
attaching dollar figures to benefits of ergonomics is so difficult, implementers 
often resorted to using analysis procedures to legitimize the ergonomics project 
in scientific terms. This was not simply their opinion but the computer “proved” 
the change was needed. 
7.5. Externally induced versus internally generated programs 
Although there was only one plant (Plant S2) whose ergonomics program 
was an internally generated program, it was so unique that it warrants a sep- 
arate discussion. The implementation process at this plant began with internal 
pressure from implementers. The implementers were not responding to insti- 
tutional pressures and top management did not impose a particular structural 
arrangement. Ergonomics had not yet gained legitimacy at the top leadership 
level, yet the implementers continued to try to justify their activities to plant 
management. As discussed above, implementation was driven by a UAW health 
and safety appointee who had contacted a professor at a local university. To- 
gether they trained and mobilized a large group of hourly workers, whose en- 
thusiasm and personal contacts brought engineers into the process. 
Cohesion among implementers was extremely strong. They repeatedly told 
us that they emphasized “we” over “I” and were busy giving credit for what 
little accomplishments they had made to each other. We observed a strong set 
of socialized elements among these implementers (see Table 3 ). However, the 
quantity of technical job changes was much smaller than at the other plants 
which also exhibited strong socialized elements. They spoke to us about how 
they had to “cut through red tape” to accomplish any type of job change. Not 
having a strong impact on technical job changes can be attributed to not having 
top leadership’s commitment. Therefore, it confirms our earlier conclusion that 
official acknowledgement of management and the establishment of a formal 
structure was important in gaining internal legitimacy and thus allocation of 
internal resources. This single case is contrary to the suggestion by Beer and 
Huse (1972) that bottom-up advocacy of workplace innovation can be just as 
effective as innovations that have top management support. 
8. Implications and directions for future research 
8.1. Theoretical implications 
We have taken the view in this paper that the adoption of ergonomics was 
an institutional phenomenon. Institutional pressures came externally and took 
the form of beliefs which preached the goodness of ergonomics. According to 
institutional theorists (Meyer and Rowan, 1977), there is a gap between the 
189 
goal of the top leaders, which is to conform, and the goal of the workers, which 
is to produce. Top leadership makes structural changes as a sign of conformity, 
but due to their conflicting goals the structural change has little social or tech- 
nical effect on within-organizational activities (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; see 
Zucker, 1987, for a review). This is commonly described as “decoupling” of 
institutional conformance from internal operations. More recently, however, 
some case studies have surfaced instances where institutional pressures ac- 
tually caused “close-coupling” of institutional conformance and internal op- 
eration (i.e., Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1988). We have seen in our multi-plant 
field study evidence for both phenomena. 
In the plants that set up new program structures and had top management 
support, institutional beliefs, instead of being decoupled, were internally per- 
petuated to the lower levels of plant organization, particularly when a team 
setup was used. Conformance to the exogenous beliefs about the value of er- 
gonomics did not end at the level of structural arrangements but went beyond 
it. New institutional elements were developed among the implementers and 
job changes occurred on the production floor. Hidden in this process are insti- 
tutional pressures actually leading to value-laden rationales for the actions. 
Though management may have had other motives, the stated motive of worker 
health promotion gained internal legitimacy and internal support was gener- 
ated to continue and sustain the ergonomics initiatives. On the other hand, the 
plants which translated external institutional pressures to internal economic 
goals showed conformance as being decoupled from the daily activities. These 
plants, by virtue of having instigated official titles for ergonomics, were able 
to publicize their conformance, but internally ergonomics made no impact. In 
conclusion, it seems that in order for institutional beliefs to propagate into the 
internal operation, its value aspect, not economic benefits, needs to be pro- 
moted and instilled within the organizations. 
8.2. Managerial implications 
There are three important implications. First, it appears that management 
motivations for implementing ergonomics will influence the ultimate success 
in actually making real change on the shopfloor. If they focus solely on short- 
term cost reduction they are not apt to make far reaching ergonomics improve- 
ments. Second, when implementing ergonomics, it appears important to con- 
sider establishing a brand new structure. It seems to harness implementers’ 
energy more effectively and offers internal legitimacy and identity. Third, when 
devising a job design strategy, management should consider the kinds of changes 
sought. If the desired impact of ergonomics is well focused on one type of change, 
the engineering approach may be sufficient. 
For example, if a meat-packing company wants to specifically reduce the 
number of Carpal Tunnel Syndrome cases of meat cutters, it may be sufficient 
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to conduct an in-depth engineering analysis of work processes associated with 
wrist motions of meat cutters. Some kind of generic changes can minimize the 
stress on the wrist, for example, by changing the design of cutting knives (Arm- 
strong, 1986). Employee inputs may still be desired, but this can be accom- 
plished through a more impersonal technique such as a formal survey as we 
saw in Plant A6. Even a modest level of worker input through a survey might 
provide ideas which lead to a better, more acceptable design and gain some 
support from the work force. In Plant Tl, the implementers lamented that they 
should have gotten more user input as there was considerable resistance to the 
newly designed seats. 
However, if the desired goal is to tailor individual jobs to fit the worker, the 
team-based, participative approach should be seriously considered. For ex- 
ample, if a diversified assembly plant that has many different job classifica- 
tions wants to improve the design of all work stations, it should look at differ- 
ent jobs individually and customize the changes. Therefore, a participative 
approach would be more effective, in terms of the quality of the changes and 
employee acceptance, than an engineering approach. 
8.3. Implications for future research. 
The inference about the role of values has implications for adoption moti- 
vation and internal goals, which have largely been overlooked in the past tech- 
nology literature. It first points out that there is institutional motivation for 
technology adoption, apart from the more popular theme of economic or stra- 
tegic motivation. It secondly points out that there are value-laden internal 
goals which emphasize doing something right rather than doing something 
economically beneficial and that value-laden goals even with no clear reference 
to economic benefits can serve to be more effective in implementing technol- 
ogy. The first point has implications for organizations’ strategies toward their 
external environments, and the second point has implications for organiza- 
tions’ strategies toward their internal operations. 
A few questions arise. In what situations do we see institutionally motivated 
technology adoption? How universal is it? Is it always true that value-laden 
internal goals are more effective in implementing technology than economic 
goals or is this a situational phenomenon? If it is situational, on what factors 
does the answer depend (e.g., type of innovation, environment, degree of cal- 
culable cause-effect relationships, etc.)? Based on our field study, we have 
only scratched the surface of answers to these impending questions. We think 
these are important questions that need to be addressed in future research. In 
the past, institutional motivation for technology has largely been overlooked, 
while the economic motivation has received ample attention (e.g., Link and 
Tassey, 1987). Likewise, scholars of technology transfer have overlooked the 
role of human values in the implementation process, although organizational 
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scholars have recognized organizational culture as having an important impact 
on organizational effectiveness (Wilkins and Ouchi, 1983; Denison, 1984,199O; 
Gordon, 1985) and values as having more appeal to workers than strategic 
economic plans (McNeil, 1987). 
The distinction between institutional and economic motivations is particu- 
larly noteworthy if we accept the notion that the early adopters tend to be more 
economically driven as opposed to the late adopters who tend to be more in- 
stitutionally driven (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). For example, the early Jap- 
anese adopters of just-in-time (JIT) inventory systems implemented it pri- 
marily to save costs resulting from work-in-process (WIP) inventory (economic 
motivation). But, when it was recognized as a world-class manufacturing tech- 
nology, a lot of American companies “got on the band wagon” and began in- 
stituting JIT (institutional motivation) without fully realizing the technical 
requirements for implementing it. (For more details of manufacturing tech- 
nology transfer between Japan and the United States, see Dertouzos et al., 
1989; Pascale, 1990, Schroeder and Robinson, 1991; Womack et al., 1990.) 
When one of the major automobile manufacturers adopted JIT, it tried to 
reduce work-in-process inventory by immediately requiring its vendors to sup- 
ply parts just-in-time. But the vendors’ internal process was not ready to ac- 
commodate the request. The result was vendors building warehouses right next 
to the plants which were requesting JIT (Pascale, 1990). The WIP inventory 
was not eliminated but merely transferred. In a survey of 453 automotive sup- 
pliers in 1988 (Helper, 1991) almost half agreed that “we are implementing 
JIT mainly because our customers demand it” and “JIT only transfers respon- 
sibility for inventory from customers to suppliers”. The JIT example illus- 
trates how economic internal goals were indeed effective for the early adopters 
(in Japan) but were not effective for the late adopters that were more insti- 
tutionally motivated. Had they focused on less concrete but more value-laden 
aspects of JIT (i.e., the value of long-term cooperative relationships with ven- 
dors, referred to as use of supplier “voice” by Helper (1991) ), the late adopters 
might have been more successful in implementing JIT. 
A similar failure of implementation was described in the in-depth case study 
of the implementation of employee participation by Moth and Bartunek (1990). 
They note that the company in their study implemented the form of the par- 
ticipative program but did not change their traditional values based on effi- 
ciency and top-down control. They demonstrate how this traditional value 
framework created a set of self-defeating cycles which led to the attempted 
change to new participative structures becoming absorbed in the traditional 
control systems. The result was that the traditional organizational structure 
never really changed. 
We concur that we still do not fully understand the organizational dynamics 
of institutionally motivated technology adoption. It seems to occur more in 
certain types of industries such as health care (Alexander and D’Aunno, 1990). 
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Nor do we understand the conditions under which value-laden internal goals 
are better or, if they are better, how to create and instill them in organizational 
contexts. We close this paper leaving the aforementioned set of questions largely 
unanswered. It is, however, important for future research to look more deeply 
into this type of institutionally-motivated technology adoption and the man- 
ner with which organizations translate it into internal operations. The mis- 
application of technology, such as failure to effectively implement useful er- 
gonomics improvements we witnessed in some plants, needs to be minimized 
and eliminated. Perhaps, a better understanding of the role of institutional 
motivations in technology adoption and of the role of organizational values in 
technology implementation can provide one fruitful avenue of inquiry. 
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